Hungary fuels language dispute with Slovakia (SME, Slovakia)

The government in Bratislava allegedly wants to introduce stricter controls on the Slovakian language skills of schoolchildren belonging to the Hungarian minority. The move is a response to a demand by Hungarian President László Sólyom that children of Hungarian minorities abroad should learn Hungarian as their first language. The liberal daily Sme has no time for this new turn in the language conflict: "The dispute over education in the majority language for children of a minority is typical of how politicians can stir up conflicts that would never arise without them. ... The Hungarian president has no idea in this matter. If he wants improvement he can raise the issue with the responsible commission, but not at an event in [the Northern Serbian province] Vojvodina. The mildly psychotic Slovakian Prime Minister [Robert Fico] was certain to react in kind. ... The current 'reinforcement' of school inspections will only be a torment for Hungarian pupils and teachers. All thanks to Sólyom." (18/03/2010)

the problem with politics in Hungary - article from Népszabadság, MAR 02 2010

The Hungarian parliament last week passed a law banning denial of the Holocaust. But the parties in Hungary are conducting a false historical discourse, writes political scientist Rafael Labanino in the left-liberal daily Népszabadság: "The political debates on the past in fact relate to the present. We see that as regards contentious issues like the Holocaust and the crimes of communism, the Socialists and the Conservatives are trying to deny each other's political correctness, democratic convictions and loyalty to the nation. The two largest political camps in Hungary do not see each other as part of the whole. They see each other as a threat to the community. The inability of the parties to reach a consensus on certain important events of our past hinders us from finding a solution to the problems of the present. This won't change as long as the way we think about our own history adheres to false schemas." (05/03/2010)



» full article (external link, Hungarian)

More from the press review on the subject » Domestic Policy, » History, » Remembrance culture, » Hungary

An Article in this week's Economist about the End of History in Central Europe

The end of history, revisited
From Economist.com

The ex-communist states of eastern Europe are leaving their pasts behind

WHERE would they be without their past, the ex-captive nations? (Or "ex-communist countries", "former Soviet satellite states", "the old Eastern block": so much history even in the category). The region between the Baltic and the Black Sea is so shaped by history that at first sight the question seems absurd. Trianon, Yalta, Molotov-Ribbentrop, Munich—the gloomy echoes of past betrayals and atrocities are inescapable.
For the past 20 years, the countries of this region have been involved in what might be called "therapeutic historiography": tearing up old communist propaganda versions of history, and writing new ones. That has been an exhilarating, messy and sometimes disconcerting process. For Estonians and Latvians, for example, it meant the chance to honour those (heroes or victims, but not villains) who fought against the impending Soviet occupation in 1944-45. Yet many outsiders see these men as no more than Nazi collaborators: they wore uniforms of the SS, the epitome of wartime evil, and served alongside some war criminals. Context and comparison (far more Russians than Balts fought on Hitler's side) become irrelevant.
Slovaks and Croats want to de-demonise their wartime republics (Nazi puppet states from one viewpoint, a snatched breath of national regeneration from another). Germans and Jews, once seemingly vanished from the region, have emerged from the shadows (and from abroad), with their own unhappy memories that undermine the self-righteousness of both Communist and ethno-nationalist versions of history.
Yet re-examining taboos is a self-limiting process: you run out of them after a bit. And historical inquiry inevitably bogs down in complexity. The communist version of history may have been mostly lies, but the western version has holes in it too. If you like closely reasoned historical monographs, you may spend your evenings examining the interplay between the Munich agreement (when Britain and France betrayed Czechoslovakia) and the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact (when Hitler and Stalin carved up Europe). For most people, it is enough that the latter deal is no longer secret or glorified.
In the luckier half of the continent, history has a much shorter half-life. Who worries about the Schleswig-Holstein question when looking at Danish-German relations? Who cares that Norway was once part of Sweden, or that Finland used to be a Grand Duchy of Czarist Russia?

Now central and eastern Europe may be joining the club of the ahistorical and apathetic. Historical rows are already the exception, not the rule. Poland is the signal example. In recent years it has successfully pursued reconciliation with Ukraine, the Czech Republic, Germany and even (albeit in limited terms) with Russia. The picture is marred only by a recent flare-up with Belarus, and a tiresome squabble with Lithuania about spelling. The recent ripple of protest in Poland when Ukraine's outgoing president, Viktor Yushchenko, made the wartime nationalist leader Stepan Bandera a "Hero of Ukraine" was interesting not because it exemplified the two countries' rows over history, but because it came after years in which they had sorted out so much.

Hungary's neighbourhood is transformed too. Relations with Slovakia are tense, thanks to a badly drafted language law there and some silly politicking. But Hungarians' real animosity is directed towards the Austrians, who have (they feel) betrayed them by selling shares in MOL, the Hungarian energy company, to Russians against their will. The historically difficult relationships with Serbia, Romania and Ukraine, all home to Magyar minorities, look chummy in comparison.

That reflects a big shift. As western Europe flounders, the old patronising and unfair treatment of the "east Europeans" is no longer sustainable. Change is in the wind. Power is up for grabs. And it is more fun than history.
Copyright © 2010 The Economist Newspaper and The Economist Group. All rights reserved.

Szigetköz, Hungary

The Szigetköz is an area of approximately 45 km long, starting at the Hungarian-Austrian border (Mosonmagyaróvár).
It is an environmental protection area, rich in flora and fauna which was put into danger by the Böcs dam project.
The area is ideal for turism: folk traditions, thermal water, hundreds of km of bike paths.
This picture was taken in October in the evening during a fishing trip with the father of a dear friend.

Sunday morning brunch on Szabadság ter

Szabadság tér is home to the Hungarian national bank, the national tv, the American embassy and Farger, one of the best places in Budapest for peaceful brunch. Picture with dear friends

Liszt Ferenc tér on a Summer Morning

One of the nicest places in Budapest to have a quiet brunch and good coffee is Liszt Ferenc tér. In good weather, terrasses welcome the tourists

Beautiful building in Budapest

One of the most beautiful buildings in Central Europe: the Hungarian Parliament (Tisztelt Ház or Országház) Picture by Ioana Florescu. Built at the end of th e 19th century, in a style known as "eclectic"

visiting Hungary besides Budapest

- Györ and Szigetköz (the Danube as it used to be)
- between the Hungarian rivers on Slovak territory: Ipoly and Garam, from Sahy to Esztergom
- Sopron, Szombathély and the Örség: history, nature and thermal baths
- Pécs, Villany, Szekszárd: wine and Sváb culture
- Tihany, Balatonf¨red, Balatonkenese: peace and forgiveness beside the water
- Mohács, Kalocsa: paprika and winter cleansing
- Miskolctapolca, Eger: mountains and water after the plains

some websites for visitors

http://www.romaniatourism.com/bucharest.html


http://www.budapestinfo.hu/en/

Perhaps the people in these countries are impatient and jealous to achieve the same high living standards as in Western Europe.
At the same time, people in Western Europe do not appreciate the level they have achieved and take social services and expensive spending patterns for granted.

A recent article from The Economist, covering the EU parliament elections, gives more content to the direction that Central (or maybe South-Central) Europe has taken:


Time to start fretting
Jun 11th 2009 From The Economist print edition
Boring centre-right parties did well—but so did quite a few nasties

INTERPRETERS in the European Parliament trying to translate the remarks of George “Gigi” Becali may struggle. Even in his native Romanian, his puzzling syntax and coarse slang make him a butt of satirists. The interpreters may also blench at what he says, especially about Jews, gays, Roma (Gypsies) and women. But they may be spared this for the time being because a court has banned the newly elected Mr Becali from leaving Romania pending a criminal trial for kidnapping.
Getty Images
Nutters? Us?
Xenophobes and populists have been elected in old European Union members such as the Netherlands too. But their east European counterparts make the westerners seem tame. Mr Becali’s fellow victor on the Greater Romania list is Corneliu Vadim Tudor, a vituperative nationalist who was once court poet to Nicolae Ceausescu, the former Communist dictator.
Yet international co-operation among politicians who hate foreigners is inherently tricky. Hungary’s far-right Jobbik party, which won three seats, may join its Balkan counterparts (including two members of Bulgaria’s explicitly racist Ataka party) in Roma-bashing. But they will have little in common when it comes to minority rights for Hungarians in neighbouring countries such as Slovakia and Romania, where Magyar irredentism is a convenient bogeyman for local chauvinists.
There were shocks at the far-left end of the spectrum too. One winner in Latvia was Alfreds Rubiks, a hardline former Communist who was jailed for backing a Kremlin-inspired coup against Latvian independence in 1991. Most Latvians see him as a pariah. His victory highlights the ominous rise of Soviet nostalgia among the country’s increasingly alienated Russians. In Estonia, by contrast, ethnic Russian parties flopped. The soft-left Centre Party got their votes, and more besides. The most striking Estonian result was the election of Indrek Tarand, a popular ex-diplomat who ran as an independent to protest against rules stopping voters from choosing among candidates on party lists.
As in western Europe, the main stories in the east were thumping wins by centre-right parties. Poland’s ruling Civic Platform did strikingly well, with 25 seats to 15 for the main opposition, the more populist Law and Justice party. In the Czech Republic the centre-right Civic Democrats won nine of the 22 seats, against seven for the Social Democrats and four for the Communists. In Hungary the ruling Socialists (ex-communists) did very badly, with only four seats to 14 for the conservative Fidesz party. That augurs well for the right in next year’s general election.
The exception was Slovakia, where the ruling centre-left Smer (Direction) party led by the prime minister, Robert Fico, did well on a paltry 19.6 % turnout, the lowest in the EU. His party won five out of 13 seats, with the fragmented conservative opposition polling poorly, as did two nationalist fringe parties in the coalition government. Both had featured in a string of recent corruption scandals.
The real significance of the elections may lie less in the composition of the new European Parliament than in pointers to the future course of national politics. Mr Fico, for example, will need to find new allies after next year’s general election if his present coalition partners continue to flop. Poland’s Civic Platform is on track to win the presidency next year.
Scandal-strewn Bulgaria is holding a parliamentary election on July 5th. If the European contest is any guide, the vote should be lively but nasty. Mafia-linked parties did alarmingly well in the European poll, though they did not win any seats. Vote-buying was common, as were other lurches towards rule-bending and ballot-rigging. In what looks like a blatant attempt to penalise minor parties, the authorities tried (but failed) to raise the election threshold to 8%, the highest in Europe. Legal chicanery meant that an opposition coalition had great difficulty even registering. Sadly, EU officials monitoring Bulgaria’s shaky progress towards clean government will have plenty to put in their next report. It is bad enough when dodgy characters win votes, but even worse when they count them.
Copyright © 2009 The Economist Newspaper and The Economist Group. All rights reserved.